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Major Findings

Faculty Political Ideology Is Overwhelmingly Liberal

Faculty at colleges and universities of all kinds in America are overwhelmingly liberal in their political ideology, creating a strong campus political culture. Categorized according to both self-identification and voting patterns, faculty are heavily weighted towards the Left. Indeed, those who identify as independents and moderates actually vote more like liberals and Democrats.

Faculty Are Not Representative of the American Public

The majority of faculty are liberal and Democratic, and therefore the full spectrum of beliefs and political behavior of the American public is underrepresented on campus.

Faculty Are Ideologically Critical of America and Business, Supportive of International Institutions

Faculty hold a certain number of beliefs that are pervasive, but not monolithic. They include:

- Criticism of many American foreign and domestic policies.
- Propensity to blame America for world problems.
• A tendency to strongly support international institutions such as the United Nations.

• Strong opposition to American unilateralism.

• Criticism of big business.

• Skepticism about capitalism’s ability to help address poverty in developing nations.

Faculty Political Culture Is Self-Perpetuating

University faculty, which moved to the left during the 1960s and 1970s, have maintained their political allegiance and are not likely to move to the right in the near future. Furthermore, new faculty members are proving to be equally if not slightly more liberal.

Some academic disciplines, especially the social sciences and humanities, exhibit particularly consistent political behaviors. Recruitment, hiring, and tenure review processes have either failed to adequately prevent this political imbalance within disciplines or have actively perpetuated and deepened political unity.

Social Science and Humanities Faculty Comprise the Liberal Core of Higher Education

Social science and humanities faculty are the most liberal and Democratic, and least diverse in their political culture. Fully 54% of the social science and humanities faculty identify as Democratic and 60% as liberal, and only 11% as Republican and 12% as conservative, a 5-to-1 ratio. Of social science faculty who voted in 2004, they were more than four times as likely to have chosen Kerry (81%) over Bush (18%) while humanities faculty were more than five times as likely (81% for Kerry, 15% for Bush).
Business Faculty Are the Most Conservative and Politically Diverse

Conservatives tend to be concentrated in business/management and healthcare fields. Business faculty are the most diverse in their political beliefs and behavior. Still, only 30% of business faculty define themselves as Republicans and 35% as conservatives—and they are the most conservative faculty on campus.

Dominant Faculty Culture Can Lead to Self-Censorship

Significant percentages of faculty acknowledge that not only students but also other faculty may feel restricted in their expression of opinion if they conflict with dominant popular views on campus.
**Recommendations**

Universities Should Work to Create an Environment with No Overwhelming Political Culture

Universities need to explore mechanisms to construct an academic environment in which no political culture—liberal, conservative, or any other—dominates as pervasively as liberal culture does today, and which simultaneously allows academics to pursue ideas and creative research freely.

Solutions Should Focus on Reinvigorating the Highest Standards of the University, Not Seeking Political Balance

Any and all solutions to a dominant faculty political culture must focus on enforcing the tenets of higher education, not on purging any one group from the campus. Efforts to strengthen the university must be pro-active rather than reactive and should view any imbalance, whether to the right or left, as evidence of a fundamental breakdown in the higher education system as a whole.

Public Grants Should Not Fund Political Agendas

Federal and state governments should monitor more carefully and thoroughly how public funds are being utilized. Grant requirements should include specifications that public grants not be used to further any particular political agenda.
Private Donors Should Make Higher Education More Accountable

Philanthropists and foundations should insure that the professorships, programs, and schools that they fund meet the criteria and purposes that match the mission and goals of the gift. This includes constructing legal agreements that guarantee donor intent.

Trustees Should Take a More Active Role in Tenure Decisions

Trustees and other stakeholders need to play an increased role in tenure decisions. Currently, trustees, with rare exception, merely rubber-stamp tenure recommendations, a lifetime employment contract. This is an abdication of fiduciary responsibility, even though many trustees may believe that protecting academic freedom requires them to always defer to the faculty.

Hiring and Promotion Processes Should Be Free of Political Ideology

Since faculty may not be aware that political or ideological tests are being applied to select their colleagues, the recruitment, hiring, and promotion practices of departments and schools should be rigorously examined to ensure that political ideology and bias play no role in choosing candidates to be interviewed, selected for faculty positions, or promoted, especially for tenure.

Departments and Schools Should Be Ideologically Open

Students should be guaranteed a wide variety of courses that offer the greatest diversity of theory, method, and analysis within each department and school. No division of any college or university should encompass or represent any particular political framework.
The Ideological Marketplace of Business Faculty Should Be the Norm, Not the Exception

Business and management faculty and schools should serve as a case study on how to achieve better diversity of political ideology.

Administrations Should Ensure Protection Against Ideological Intimidation or Discrimination

Universities should carefully review their current procedures for addressing issues of intellectual and political discrimination, both among the student body and within faculty ranks. Administrators should ensure that mechanisms that are in place for reporting abuses actually work effectively, including publicizing student and faculty rights. Grievance systems must be readily accessible.

Universities Must Maintain High Standards

Colleges and universities must employ methods of evaluation that insure that their own basic principles of academic integrity and accountability are implemented. Accountability should not interfere with academic freedom, nor should claims of academic freedom interfere with accountability.

The State of Higher Education Should Be a Topic of Research and Debate

The purpose, history, and current state of higher education must be more actively studied. The basic tenets of academia, including academic freedom, honest debate, and rigorous scholarship, must become more of a focus of research both within academia and among independent think tanks. Included in this effort should be initiatives to educate the public about higher education in America, opening up debate over the state of higher education to all stakeholders.
DATA SUMMARY

“Which of the following best describes your position on most political issues?”

“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as?”

- Only 16% of faculty identify as Republican and 17% as conservative or very conservative versus 46% who identify as Democrat and 48% as liberal or very liberal. This represents just under a 3-to-1 disparity in favor of Democrats and liberals.

- Conservatives tend to be concentrated in the business/management and health care faculty. Business faculty are the most conservative, but at the same time, the most diverse in their beliefs and behavior. Only 30% of business faculty define themselves as Republicans and 35% as conservatives—and they are by far the most conservative faculty on campus.

- The social science and humanities faculty show little political diversity at all. Fully 54% of the social science and humanities faculty identify as Democratic and 60% as liberal, and only 11% as Republican and 12% as conservative, a 5-to-1 ratio.
• Those faculty with the highest religiosity and observance are the most conservative and most likely to vote Republican. Thirty-one percent of those for whom religion is very important answered that they were conservative and 29% Republican, 38% voted for Bush. Likewise, 36% of those faculty who attend religious services weekly are conservative and 32% Republican, 44% voted for Bush. Moreover, Evangelical Christians and, to a lesser extent, Catholics and other Christians tend to be more conservative and Republican than their Jewish and non-religious colleagues. Fifty-four percent of Evangelicals are conservative and 48% are Republican versus 3% of Jews who are conservative and 2% Republican, and 7% of atheists who are conservative and 3% Republican.

“Whom did you vote for in the 2004 presidential election?”

• In the 2004 presidential elections, 25% of faculty who voted voted for George W. Bush, while 72% voted for Senator John Kerry and 3% for other candidates, including Ralph Nader. Of social science faculty who voted, they were more than four times as likely to have chosen Kerry (81%) over Bush (18%) while humanities faculty were more than five times as likely (81% for Kerry, 15% for Bush).

• Evangelical Christians, by a ratio of more than 2-to-1, are the only faculty religious group to vote in favor of Bush: 68% versus 30% for Kerry. The closest to Evangelicals are Catholics, a distant 29% in favor of Bush and 69% for Kerry, and non-Evangelical Christians, 26% for Bush and 70% for Kerry. Of those who voted, 90% of faculty with no religion or atheist voted for Kerry and 8% for Bush. Jewish faculty voted 87% for Kerry and 11% for Bush, exceeding the propensity of the American Jewish public to vote Democratic.
Faculty political ideology, party self-identification and voting patterns.

- Many more faculty (37%) identify as Democrat and liberal, and voted for Kerry and other Democrats in the House of Representatives than those who identify as Republican and conservative and voted for Bush and House Republican candidates (11%).

- While those who identify as liberal or as a Democrat nearly always vote accordingly, those who identify as conservative or as a Republican may or may not vote for the Republican candidate. This holds true for both the presidential and congressional elections. In the presidential election, while 1% of Democrats and 1% of those identifying as liberal or very liberal voted for Bush, 13% of Republicans and 8% of those identifying as conservative or very conservative voted for Kerry. In the congressional elections, just under 2% of Democrats and those identifying as liberal or very liberal voted for the Republican candidate, while 8% of Republicans and 12% of those identifying as conservative or very conservative voted for the Democratic candidate.

- Among those independent faculty who voted in the 2004 presidential election, only 27% voted for Bush while 66% voted for Kerry, a 2.5-to-1 ratio. Among those faculty who identified as moderate/middle-of-the-road, 27% voted for Bush and 68% for Kerry, a 2.5-to-1 ratio. In the 2004 congressional election, 66% percent of independent faculty voted for the Democratic candidate and 28% for the Republican, more than a 2-to-1 ratio. Among those who identified as moderate/middle-of-the-road, 64% voted Democratic and 32% Republican, a 2-to-1 ratio.
“The attacks against the United States on September 11th are justified by legitimate grievances against U.S. policies and practices.”

• When asked to respond to this statement, fully 95% of faculty disagreed, the most overwhelming response in the survey. About 3% agreed, and 2% were not sure.

“Which TWO of the following do you believe are most responsible for the growth of Islamic militancy?”

• While 95% of faculty do not feel the 9-11 attacks were justified, 54% of faculty believe that the United States policies in the Middle East are partially responsible for the growth of Islamic militancy. While 64% see political corruption/oppression in the militants’ home countries as a cause, 54% list United States policies; about 29% also listed the spread of Western culture while 25% named the Islamic religion itself. Faculty as a whole are two times as likely to blame the United States rather than Islam itself and the humanities faculty are three times as likely to cite the United States versus Islam itself.

“From what you know about it, do you feel the powers granted the United States government under the Patriot Act should be strengthened, reduced, or left pretty much unchanged?”

• Only 5% of faculty want to strengthen the USA Patriot Act, while 64% want it reduced, 20% want it left unchanged and 11% were unsure. Within the humanities, 80% wanted to reduce the powers of the Patriot Act, while less than 1% wanted to see it strengthened.
“Many of the problems that now exist in Middle Eastern countries can be traced to misguided American policies.”

- Almost half of faculty at least partially blame America for problems in the Middle East: 47% agreed with the statement and 42% disagreed. Fifty-eight percent of humanities faculty agreed versus 28% of business faculty. The view is held by 66% of liberal faculty versus 15% of conservative faculty, and 58% of Kerry voters versus 13% of Bush voters.

“The United States does more to help people in developing nations than it does to harm them.”

- While 72% of health faculty agreed and 72% of business faculty agreed, only 42% of humanities faculty agreed. Overall, 59% of faculty agreed with the statement, while 22% disagreed and 19% were unsure.

- Eighty-nine percent of conservative and 88% of Republican faculty agreed, while only 4% and 5%, respectively, disagreed. Meanwhile, only 41% of liberal and 50% of Democratic faculty agreed and 35% and 29%, respectively, disagreed, with 24% and 22% not sure.

“America has made a contribution to the world by expanding freedom to more and more people.”

- About 68% of United States college faculty agreed with the statement. Twenty-three percent disagreed and 9% were unsure. Within humanities, 56% agreed and 34% disagreed. Seventy-six percent of health and 75% of business faculty agreed while 19% and 17%, respectively, disagreed.
“Which TWO of the following countries do you think are the greatest threats to international stability?”

- Almost one third of faculty list America as the “greatest threat to global stability.” About 29% name the United States, second only to North Korea (70%). The third choice was Iran, 27%. China was named by 19% of faculty, Iraq 13%, Israel 12%, Pakistan 8%, Syria 7%, and Russia 4%. Faculty see the United States as a greater threat to world stability than Russia by a ratio of 7-to-1. Nearly half of humanities faculty, 46%, see the United States as a threat to international stability as do 34% of social science faculty.

“Please rate each of the following countries in terms of your perception of their record on human rights over the past five years or so.”

- On a scale of 0-10, with ten being the best, 47% of faculty ranked the United States’ record on human rights 8-10. Another 30% ranked it 6 or 7 (a total of 76% ranking the United States above 5). About 23% ranked it 5 or less, including 34% of the humanities faculty.

“Supporting institutions like the International Court of Justice is the right policy even if it would limit America’s options.”

- By more than a 3-to-1 margin, faculty agreed with the statement. Humanities faculty endorse this idea by a factor of more than 5-to-1, 73% to 14%. Liberal faculty support global institutions over United States autonomy by margins of 86% to 3%, a factor of almost 30-to-1.
“There are certain moral values that should apply across all cultures, societies, and nations.”

- Eighty-four percent of all faculty agreed with the idea of universal morals. Only 13% disagreed and 4% answered unsure. The only faculty group who agreed at significantly less than 80% were those faculty under 35 years old, who showed a marked drop-off at 71%.

“There are no moral values that can be applied across all cultures, societies, and nations.”

- A total of 81% disagreed, 17% agreed and 2% were not sure.

“If actions by the United Nations or others fail to reduce the ethnic violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan, would you favor sending United States military troops?”

- Forty percent of faculty said yes, 49% said no, and 12% were not sure. Liberals were more likely to say yes than conservatives, 45% to 36%.

“Each society or nation has a right to its own cultural practices—for example, arranged marriages of girls 12 to 14.”

- A total of 51% of faculty agreed, 37% disagreed, and 12% were not sure. About 48% of female faculty agreed.
“If other nations are unwilling to join America in fighting terrorism around the globe, then America must go it alone.”

- About 58% of faculty disagreed and 34% agreed with the statement. Only 13% of liberals and 19% of Democrats agreed that America should fight terrorism alone if it must, versus 78% of conservatives and 77% of Republicans. Only 24% of atheists and those with no religion agreed, versus 56% of Evangelical Christians. About 18% of Kerry voters agreed that America should fight terrorism alone if it must, versus 79% of Bush voters.

“I would prefer a United Nations with more authority over resolving international disputes including disputes involving the United States.”

- Seventy percent of faculty agreed with the statement, 22% disagreed, and 8% were not sure. Women faculty endorsed the idea more than men, 76% to 67%. A slight majority of business faculty endorsed the idea, 55%, lower than any other segment of the faculty. Liberal faculty agreed with the statement 88% to 6%, a ratio of 15-to-1, and Democrats 86% to 9%.

“Even if most other countries support a particular international agreement which the United States disagrees with, the United States must do what is in its own interest.”

- Overall, 36% of faculty agreed, while 52% disagreed and 12% are not sure.
“People in developing countries benefit more that they lose from involvement of global corporations.”

- Only 38% agreed with the statement, while 37% disagreed and 25% were not sure. About 66% of Republicans agreed and only 16% disagreed about the benefits of global corporations. Similarly, 68% of conservatives agreed and only 14% disagreed. Liberals and Democrats are the opposite—only 24% of liberals endorse global corporations’ benefits and 52% disagreed. Likewise, 27% of Democrats agreed and 44% disagreed.

“International trade agreements have favored large corporations to the disadvantage of people and local businesses in less developed countries.”

- Overall, 73% of faculty agreed, 16% disagreed and 11% answered that they were not sure.

“Although capitalism helped bring prosperity to this country, it is not well suited to accomplish the same thing today in most developing nations.”

- Thirty-six percent of faculty agreed and 48% disagreed.
“How often, if at all, do you perceive that faculty at your institutions are reluctant to express their views because they might be contrary to the dominant or ‘popular’ position.”

- Twenty-five percent said very/fairly often, and another 38% said occasionally, a total of 63%. Thirty-seven percent of business/management faculty said very/fairly often, compared to 22% of social science/humanities faculty. Younger faculty, 32%, were also more likely to say very/fairly often. Conservatives, 32%, were more likely to say very/fairly often, compared to liberals, 22%. Minority faculty also feel more constrained, 36% say very/fairly often compared to 24% of white faculty.

“How often, if at all, do you perceive that ethnic or religious minority students at your institution are reluctant to express their views because they might be contrary to those held by the faculty?”

- Twenty-one percent said very/fairly often, and another 38% said occasionally, a total of 59%. About 31% of minority faculty said very/fairly often, compared to 19% of white faculty.
INTRODUCTION

America is politically polarized. The election of George W. Bush in 2000, and in particular the prolonged dispute over the final results, reinforced a division that has become even more rigid in the years since that election. As of this writing, Republicans control not only the White House, but the Senate and House as well. Two conservative justices have been appointed to the Supreme Court. The American Left has been increasingly disenfranchised. This may change quickly in any election cycle, including the upcoming November 2006 elections, but the effect of the polarization in American politics will likely remain.

Common concern after 9-11 united Americans. However, 9-11 itself would become the source of new rifts. Different Americans interpreted the attacks very differently, even more so on how to respond. Nearly all Americans see 9-11 as unwarranted, unprovoked and nothing short of an act of barbarism and war. Some also interpret the attacks as caused, partially or entirely, by misguided American policies and belligerence regarding the Middle East—and see no contradiction between the two views. Some fringe politicians, as well as some of the American public, even hold conspiracy theories that President Bush knew about the attacks before their execution.¹

America’s university and college faculty who, by both political self-identification and practice, as this study will show, overwhelm-
ingly lean to the political Left, have been at the forefront of this political divide. Faculty in America, in many ways, have aligned themselves in direct opposition to the political philosophy of the conservative base voting for the prevailing political power. Some faculty voices have become increasingly loud criticizing the conservative tilt of the government and, in some cases, extremely controversial. Statements made in classrooms, on college campuses, to the general public, and in popular media have all brought renewed attention on the political ideology among faculty. Do these public voices truly represent America’s college faculty? Do they reflect the fringe or the voice of a dominant political ideology? If so, what are the components of this ideology? And finally, what are the implications for teaching and scholarship of any political ideology embraced by a majority of professors?

Levels of ideological uniformity can develop in any environment and can begin to define the character of entire institutions. Faculty and universities are no different. In the case of college faculty today, more than a few are bound by a common set of political beliefs and behavior. More faculty identify as Democrat and liberal, and voted for Kerry and other Democrats (House of Representatives) than those who identify as Republican and conservative and voted for Bush and other Republican candidates. The liberal core of the faculty outweighs, by far, any other political segment of college faculty. At the same time, it would be wrong to characterize most faculty as political extremists, out of touch with America, or a collection of radicals. On many measures, they share common beliefs with most Americans. But they are overwhelmingly liberal and Democratic.

This may not seem evident at first glance, since significant proportions of faculty identify as moderate and independent, the second largest political constituency among faculty. But the data show that this group behaves more often than not as liberals and Democrats: they vote for Democratic candidates by a ratio of 2-to-1. On campus, moderate and independent really mean liberal and Demo-
ocratic by significant margins. Political conservatives, who constitute a small minority on campus, tend to be more concentrated in specific academic fields such as business and management. The core conservative/Republican faculty is about 16-17%. Although faculty are not uniform in their beliefs about a wide variety of economic, social, and ethical issues, there are clear dimensions of a political ideology on campus today.

The ideology has four elements. First, there is a form of consistent criticism of America: a propensity to blame America for world problems. Many faculty see America, despite the opportunities it may create for them as individuals, as among the foremost global threats among nations. What emerges is a collective voice that regards America, its power, its principles, and its actions, as often suspect, unethical, or unjust.

Second, faculty tend to be critical of business. Business institutions (“big business”) are often criticized by a majority of Americans in general, whether oil, drug or other large companies. Certainly the Enron and WorldCom scandals added to the negative views. Faculty tend to be on the more critical side. Additionally, the survey shows a substantial proportion of social science and humanities faculty are skeptical about capitalism itself.

Third, faculty support international institutions such as the United Nations and the International Court of Justice over American autonomy and unilateralism. This component of the ideology is strong enough that even crises such as “genocide” in the Sudan are not compelling enough (at least in Spring 2005) for faculty to advocate sending United States troops to stop the violence if other options fail. They are committed globalists and are willing to limit American power to support and bolster international institutions. This desire goes hand in hand with the first component of faculty ideology, criticism of America. Faculty tend not to trust American foreign policy, and even less so when the United States acts unilaterally. The default position is to trust the collective international community more than the American government.
A fourth component of this ideology—a strong belief in keeping religion out of the public domain—will be analyzed in a subsequent monograph entitled, “The Religious Beliefs and Behavior of College Faculty.” While faculty are less religious than the public, they are not anti-religion, with a strong majority affirming a belief in God. Faculty do, however, advocate a strict segregation of church and state and regard with hostility those they believe inject too much religion into the public sector.

It is important to point out that the dominant ideology is not a ubiquitous one. All faculty do not necessarily believe all the same things. They are split on complex social and moral issues. (Our survey did not explore issues that often are used as benchmarks to distinguish liberal versus conservative beliefs among Americans: taxation, gun control, and social programs, among others.) Faculty certainly parrot one another in terms of political behavior, but there is a broader range of beliefs within certain boundaries than one might assume, given the narrow political behavior evidenced in voting behavior. But the political imbalance reflects a core ideology from which the faculty, as a whole, do not stray very far.

The political ideology permeates all segments of the faculty and tends to be more influential than demographic factors such as gender, age, and race, which are usually strong indicators of belief and behavior. There are a few areas in which these normally determinant divisions still influence the beliefs and behavior of faculty. Younger faculty, when they do differ from older faculty, tend to be more critical of America and business. The same for women compared to men: they tend to be more liberal, more critical of America, and supporters of international institutions as opposed to American unilateralism. Faculty who are religious tend to be more conservative and vote more Republican, and less religious faculty tend to be more liberal and vote Democratic. Party affiliations, voting patterns and self-identified political ideology are the strongest predictors of belief. It is important to note, however, that while most conser-
ervatives are Republican and most liberals are Democrats, there are those faculty whose party affiliation does not necessarily align with their ideology. For this reason, both party affiliation and ideology data are provided independently throughout this monograph.

Nevertheless, faculty are more differentiated by academic field than demographic factors: social science and humanities faculty are the most consistently liberal and tend to be more uniform in their beliefs. Business faculty are the most conservative, but at the same time, the most diverse in their beliefs and behavior. Only 30% of business faculty define themselves as Republicans and 35% as conservatives—and they are by far the most conservative faculty on campus.
Why Does Faculty Political Culture Matter?

The political beliefs and behavior of college faculty are important for four reasons. First, studies show that high percentages of students have experienced faculty bringing personal political views into the classroom. While one can debate if this is a good or bad phenomenon in principle, the argument becomes a different one if students are exposed to faculty who all think the same way (as, for example, humanities faculty do on a number of issues explored in our survey). We do not believe that students are unthinking automatons, or blank slates to be written upon by propagandizing faculty, but exposure to such a skewed faculty political identity and behavior, as we document in this monograph, cheats students of the wide and varied exposure that a four-year experience in college should provide.

Faculty play a role on campus far beyond their time in the classroom. They formally advise students in their class and major selections. They give lectures open to the entire campus, participate in panels, speak at rallies or protests, hold office hours and assign students their own writing and research as part of course requirements. Groupthink and behavior may not program students, but it certainly deprives them (although in some disciplines it might even mold them as well). Moreover, Republicans, conservatives,
Evangelicals, or other current exceptions should not represent or be characterized as the “minority view,” but rather as another equally important and valid view. The ideologies and viewpoints on the college campus should be so richly diverse that students are exposed to new, bold ways of thinking that stretch and expand one’s knowledge.

Second, college faculty are supposed to provide a broad range of analytical tools, intellectual paradigms, and approaches to addressing problems in American society and around the world. How can sociology departments that receive grants from private donors, foundations, state, and federal governments provide objective, or even creative solutions, when by a ratio of 44-to-1 they register as Democrats? If personal political ideology guides not only teaching, but research, what can a nationwide faculty offer in terms of thoughtful policy dealing with poverty, approaches to immigration, and other complex issues if practically all faculty look at these issues through the same political lens? Middle East Studies centers and departments, for example, are notorious for their political agenda and for introducing political bias in the classroom. When funders, private or public, are paying for research to help guide public policy, are they getting the most rigorous examination possible, or are they funding preconceived political agendas? Can faculty think creatively, when they clearly operate confined within their own ideological box?

Third, college faculty are widely called upon as pundits in the media, consultants to non-profit organizations, and experts to advise public officials. Faculty retain a high degree of social, moral, and intellectual authority and prestige. In spite of a strain of anti-intellectualism in American society, professors are looked to for advice, guidance, and wisdom. Stanford University, Harvard University, Yale University and other elite institutions carry particular weight, as do many locally respected institutions such as Emory University in Atlanta, or the University of Kansas in Lawrence. Chances are that a humanities or social science faculty member will
Why Does Faculty Political Culture Matter?

represent the Left, unless special care is taken to find a “conservative” professor. As in the classroom, conservative faculty represent the “minority view,” when the campus should promote no view as representative of the collective thinking of higher education.

Fourth, a dominant political ideology and behavior, seeping into teaching and research, corrupts the very ideal of higher education. It cheapens what the university is about and what it can achieve. Vigorous and rigorous debate, opposing views, challenging conventional wisdom, all grounded in the theory and data of accepted norms in a field are what enrich higher education. Ratios of 10-to-1 and 44-to-1 in favor of any group on campus limit that melting pot of ideas, allowing faculty to largely agree with each other, while tinkering at the margins about trivial details, tangents, or insignificant findings. Groupthink strangles the heart and soul of the ideal of the liberal university.

How limiting is campus “conventional wisdom”?

This analysis shows one chilling effect of common ideology: most faculty say that, to one degree or another, that their colleagues are reluctant to speak out against what they consider dominant or popular opinions at their institutions. When asked “How often, if at all, do you perceive that faculty at your institutions are reluctant to express their views because they might be contrary to the dominant or ‘popular’ position?” 25% said very/fairly often, and another 38% said occasionally, a total of 63%, in an institution where the answer should be zero, or as close to zero as possible. About 37% of business/management faculty said very/fairly often, compared to 22% of social science/humanities faculty. Younger faculty were also more likely to say very/fairly often, 32%, perhaps concerned about their promotion and tenure decisions. Conservatives, 32%, were more likely to say very/fairly often, compared to liberals, 22%. Minority faculty also feel more constrained: 36% say very/fairly often compared to 24% of white faculty. Faculty who feel they are not
“in step” are the most concerned that views are being self-censored on campus.

Similarly, when asked, “How often, if at all, do you perceive that ethnic or religious minority students at your institution are reluctant to express their views because they might be contrary to those held by the faculty?” 21% said very/fairly often, and another 38% said occasionally, a total of 59%. About 31% of minority faculty said very/fairly often, compared to 19% of white faculty. How can the university be touting diversity when nearly three of every five faculty members believe that racial and religious minorities are afraid to express their views to faculty? As it turns out, faculty believe that both professors and students are not always free to express themselves. Perhaps no more troubling conclusion can be drawn from this survey. In an institution that trumpets academic freedom as the most sacred principle in the university system, this is a disturbing finding, and points to the need for reform.

This study does not label faculty as radicals. Faculty do share beliefs and political behavior with a significant segment of the American public. But as our parallel survey of the general public shows, faculty line up with Americans who identify as liberal and vote Democratic. It would be inaccurate to say that faculty, in terms of political identity and behavior are “out of the American mainstream.” Rather, if American politics and the voting public are equally divided into streams, faculty tend to align with only one of them—the Democratic/liberal one, especially social science and humanities faculty. However, one can also conjecture that an ideology held by a large majority might also guide survey responses that adhere to a kind of political correctness, where faculty answer uniformly regardless of their individual beliefs. Intense criticism of faculty views of 9-11 might have led to an overcompensation in this respect, where only 3% of faculty justified the 9-11 attacks whereas 14% of the American public did so. Certainly it is possible that faculty do, indeed, near universally reject justification for terror or any
violence. However, the dramatic disparity between the public and faculty, as well as other answers by faculty that seem to reverse their position, raise questions about whether some topics elicit somewhat normative and therefore not entirely truthful responses. The same could be said for the seeming contradictions between positive faculty feelings about capitalism (again beyond that of the general public) and their strong criticism of international trade agreements and global corporations, analyzed later in this monograph.
LITERATURE REVIEW

THE POLITICAL VIEWS OF AMERICAN COLLEGE FACULTY

The modern-day controversy surrounding the political and social values of college faculty began in the 1960s. The Sixties—a time of social upheaval exemplified by the Civil Rights movement, feminism, Vietnam War protests, and the youth/student counterculture movement—generated renewed interest and new research in this field. Political scientist Everett Carll Ladd and sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset were among the first to systematically explore the attitudes, beliefs, and values of academics empirically through surveys. As many had suspected, the general finding was that professors lined up decidedly to the left of Americans on most of the hotly debated domestic and foreign policy issues of the time. Lipset and Ladd also demonstrated that the observed pattern was most evident among professors at the most prestigious institutions: the more distinguished the institution, the more liberal the faculty—a reversal of the customary social science relationship, which specifies that the more privileged and powerful tend to be more conservative. To explain this phenomenon, Lipset conjectured that intellectual creativity is associated with critical social views.

When faculty were classified by academic field, the research showed that faculty in the social sciences and humanities were the most left/liberal, followed by professors in the physical and biologi-
cal sciences; at the other end of the spectrum stood professors of engineering and, not surprisingly, business. Thus, professional status and academic field of study were two variables found to be correlated with faculty political views and behavior.

A series of surveys by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1969, 1975) and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1984), provided further documentation of the liberal politics of college professors, especially teachers in the social sciences and humanities. This and other work, some of which was also directed by Lipset and Ladd, led to growing criticism aimed at higher education by conservatives such as Roger Kimball, Dinesh D’Souza, and, very recently, David Horowitz.\(^{10}\)

In an early 1990s re-analysis of the Carnegie data, Richard Hamilton and Lowell Hargens argued in response that the left-wing distinctiveness of United States faculty appeared to be diminishing and that it was largely confined to social science and humanities fields, being much less prominent among other disciplines.\(^{11}\) But the view that faculty radicalism is declining has been a minority opinion.

While the patterns initially uncovered by Lipset, Ladd, and their associates have been replicated in subsequent studies, debate over the source of the differences—how much to attribute to self-selection (that more liberals than conservatives are drawn to college teaching and especially to certain academic disciplines) and how much to socialization within the profession—has continued, occasioning much discussion. Pinpointing the cause leads to different policy implications.

Research of more current vintage includes several surveys conducted since 2000. The Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) series of surveys, administered by UCLA’s Higher Education Research Institute (HERI), provides another oft-cited data source on social and political views of college faculty. The main findings of the 2001-02 study showed a decline in professors identifying as “middle-of-the-road” in their political orientation
(now 34%, down from 40% in 1989), with most of the corresponding gains coming in the “liberal / far left” category (48%, up from 42%). Faculty identifying themselves as “conservative” or “far right” was virtually unchanged at just 18%. Most of the change has occurred among female faculty, who are 10% more liberal than their male counterparts (54% vs. 44%) and significantly less likely than male faculty to describe themselves as conservative (14% vs. 21%). Like most other recent data sources, the UCLA surveys contain few questions measuring social or political attitudes (beyond liberal/conservative self-identification).

The same applies to a recent survey published in 2005 developed by economist Christopher E. Cardiff and Daneil B. Klein. Cardiff and Klein surveyed faculty at eleven California colleges of all types focusing on voter registration and found an overall 5-to-1 ratio in favor of Democrats. However, broken down by academic discipline, some of the findings were radically more unbalanced, such as the 44-to-1 ratio in favor of Democrats within the social sciences. At the University of California, Berkeley, Cardiff and Klein found 445 Democrats to only 45 Republicans, a 10-to-1 ratio for faculty at that school.

However, Klein also conducted a survey in the spring of 2003, also published in 2005 with Charlotta Stern, that did ask questions regarding policy views in addition to self-identification and voting patterns. Klein surveyed members of six professional associations in the social sciences, history, and philosophy asking, “To which political party have the candidates you’ve voted for in the past ten years mostly belonged?” Fully 80% of them answered “Democrat,” 8% answered “Republican,” and the rest named the Green or Libertarian Party, named multiple parties (less than one percent of which included “Republican”), gave other replies, or did not answer. Among the general population, in contrast, the distribution in political party identification has been even or only slightly favoring the Democrats in most polls taken over the past decade. Klein ob-
serves that campus culture proclaims diversity a virtue, but that it is not borne out in the number of Republicans on the faculty (at least not in these six fields) and, inferentially, by a balance of thinking (more conservative) on politics and policy. Moreover, the liberal ideology of faculty was further evidenced in responses to most policy questions including such topics as gun control, government ownership of industry, taxation, economic policy, immigration, American military aid and others. Ideological diversity, as measured by traditional social policy questions, was lowest among Democrats and “by far” the greatest among economics professors. Moreover, Klein and Stern noted that those faculty deviating from left-wing views were as likely to be libertarian as Republican.\textsuperscript{14}

Klein and other conservatives such as those associated with the Princeton, New Jersey-based National Association of Scholars and the Students for Academic Freedom have spotlighted student surveys\textsuperscript{15} that they interpret as suggesting the existence of a pervasive left-wing bias at universities, creating pressures to conform to the prevailing orthodoxy and intolerance of those who seek to dissent from the dominant views. Included among these views are anti-capitalism, anti-Christian bias, cultural relativism, internationalism, anti-Israelism, and pervasive criticism of America and American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{16}

Perhaps the best, though far from conclusive, recent research on the social/political views of professors can be found in a 2005 article by Stanley Rothman, S. Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte, appearing in the new online journal, \textit{The Forum}.\textsuperscript{17} Based on analysis of the United States faculty sample from the 1999 North American Academic Study Survey (NAASS), Rothman, et al. found, as have others, broad commitment to liberalism, especially on social or “lifestyle” issues, and a sharp leftward shift in liberal self-identification since the 1984 Carnegie survey. As for political partisanship, half of the sample (50%) identified as Democrats, 33% as independents, 11% as Republicans, and 5% as “other.” They also found that politi-
cal differences between social science and humanities faculty and professors in other fields have narrowed considerably, as faculty in other disciplines have moved leftward.¹⁸

To summarize, the research reviewed indicates that college professors affiliate disproportionately as Democrats and are more likely to consider themselves liberals rather than conservatives—in both cases, much more so than the general population—and that they tend to take more “liberal” positions on issues such as homosexuality, stem-cell research, and abortion. The latter set of concerns tend to be controversies which, along with church-state separation, have increasingly influenced political debate in this country, often producing the sharpest divide between those on the right and those on the left.

With the exception of the Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte analysis,¹⁹ and Klein’s study of social scientists, we find much of the research over the past 25 years limited in scope. Almost none of the studies goes beyond presenting measures of party identification or liberal-conservative self-identification, which, as noted, can be an ambiguous expression of one’s political behavior. Earlier studies that go into greater depth (such as Lipset’s and Lipset and Ladd’s work) are now quite dated. It is also the case that some of the more current papers on the subject, e.g., Daniel Klein’s, are confined to professors in a few disciplines—typically, those in the social sciences or the social sciences and several humanities fields—and so cannot speak to the political beliefs of a broader cross-section of United States college faculty.

In the few instances when these studies have measured substantive political beliefs or opinions, the range of content has been narrow. Faculty views have been studied mainly in the context of domestic politics (e.g., focusing on size of government, social welfare spending, social/life-style issues) and has not been examined with reference to United States foreign policy issues, international relations, the place of religion in the public sphere, or cultural dif-
ferences—topics in the forefront of much contemporary political discussion including debate over policies and strategies for combating international terrorism.

Probably because of reliance on small or weakly representative samples, few of the studies reviewed have attempted in-depth profiling of political segments to see if there are differences among men and women, younger and older professors, by type of institution, by academic field, by rank, and by other variables. We are also unaware of previous studies that have systematically compared faculty views with those of the general public across a range of politically relevant content. It is to these questions that our analysis is addressed.

This survey of faculty is substantially different from previous work conducted by other scholars. First, it is a representative sample of all faculty, excluding community colleges, and is a large enough sample (over 1200) to look at a wide variety of subdivisions within the faculty by academic field, religious identity, demographic breakdowns, and other factors. We also looked at beliefs and opinions not explored before in any other faculty survey: attitudes about American foreign policy, capitalism, and the academy itself. Third, we conducted a parallel study of the general public, which allows comparisons between faculty and the American population. Fourth, we were able, because of the sample size and because we looked at both political identity and behavior, to examine more carefully and thoroughly these aspects of faculty. It is important to analyze what people do as well as what they say. By looking at both identity and behavior, we were able to determine that most self-identified “moderates” and “independents” behaved like liberals and Democrats when they actually vote. This allows a more accurate depiction of faculty political behavior than self-labels or party registration data.

While there are some discernable differences between types of colleges, on the whole, the findings of this survey are applicable across institution type. Certainly, considering the consistency and importance of religious identity as a factor influencing responses,
private, denominational schools represent the furthest outliers among all types of colleges. But even these colleges do not stray far from the dominant norm. The most “elite” universities are also the most liberal. Beyond these distinctions, most universities, public or private, large or small, prestigious or second “tier,” Northern or Southern, employ faculty whose political behavior is very uniform.

The analysis of college faculty political and religious beliefs will be released in a series of monographs. This first, on political behavior and ideology, will be followed by a report on faculty religious beliefs and behavior. A third monograph will examine faculty beliefs about American policy in the Middle East, including attitudes about Israel. Shorter papers and essays will be written about specific questions in the survey. A follow-up survey will be conducted.
Political Identity and Behavior

Faculty responses to self-identification questions about political party and political ideology highlight the disparity represented by voting in the presidential and congressional elections. Only 16% of faculty identify as Republican and 17% as conservative or very conservative versus 46% who identify as Democrat and 48% as liberal or very liberal (See Figures 1, 2). This represents just under a 3-to-1 disparity in favor of Democrats and liberals. Among the general public, 28% identify as Republican and 31% identify as conservative or very conservative versus 32% who identify as Democrat and 22% as liberal or very liberal.

Figure 1: With which political party do you identify?20

- Democrat 46%
- Republican 16%
- Independent 33%
- Prefer not to answer 5%

Figure 2: Which of the following best describes your positions on most political issues?

- Liberal 48%
- Conservative 17%
- Other/ Don’t Know 5%
- Moderate 31%
This disparity begins to define a faculty-specific political spectrum, where “conservative” and “liberal” do not necessarily mean the same thing as in the general population. The entire political spectrum among faculty is shifted leftward. Most moderates are really liberals, and those that are right-leaning or Republican are less ideologically committed to their position than those self-identifying as liberal or Democrat.

Thirty-three percent of faculty identify as independent and 31% as moderate. Of those who voted in the general public, independents voted 40% for Kerry and 49% for Bush. Those identifying as moderate/middle-of-the-road voted 43% for Bush and 52% for Kerry. These percentages are generally representative of their labels, of voters who may lean toward the conservative Republican or the liberal Democrat. However, among faculty, independents voted 66% for Kerry and 27% for Bush, and moderates voted similarly with 68% for Kerry and 27% for Bush.

Among all faculty, 16% identify as Republicans and 17% as conservative. Excluding denominational schools, the percentages of Republicans and conservatives each drop to 15%. This drop is magnified within academic discipline. Excluding denominational schools, only 4% of humanities faculty identify as Republican and the same holds true for those identifying as conservative. Humanities faculty in general are already overwhelmingly liberal, but excluding denominational schools, the numbers of those on the right are cut in half.

How skewed are the faculty to the liberal/Democratic side of political identification? Seventy percent of all faculty do not identify as Republican, did not vote for Bush, do not identify as conservative, and did not vote for the Republican candidate for the House Representatives. Only 11% of faculty answered all of these questions affirmatively, representing the “core” of conservative/Republican faculty. While only one out of every ten faculty members is staunchly conservative, nearly four out of ten are committed liberals—37% of
the faculty identify as Democrats, voted for Kerry, identify as liberal, and voted for the Democratic candidate. This is the strongest core political identity on campus. This number would be higher if self-identified moderates were more self-aware of their true political behavior—they say they are moderates, but they vote like liberals.

The 2000 and 2004 elections reaffirmed the most common outcome in America’s presidential elections: closely contested races in which a few percentage points separate the winner and loser. The general public is most often evenly divided. At rare times, presidential candidates trounced their opponents with about 60% of the popular vote. But these are exceptions in American politics. The Democrats may be favored in one election cycle and the Republicans in another, but very rarely by wide margins. American politics gravitate toward the center, although the base of each party may not.

The same is not true for college faculty. In 2004, of our sample of 1269 faculty members, 1082 voted, and of these, 25% voted for George W. Bush, while 72% voted for Senator John Kerry and 3% for other candidates, including Ralph Nader (See Figure 3). Even wider gaps are shown among academic disciplines. Of social science faculty who voted, they were more than four times as likely to have chosen Kerry (81%) over Bush (18%) while humanities faculty were more than five times as likely (81% for Kerry, 15% for Bush). Within the general public, of those who voted, 51% voted for Bush, 45% for Kerry and 4% for other candidates.

Humanities faculty are the most consistently liberal/Democratic, and social science faculty are not far behind. Business and health faculty tend to be more conservative (with business fac-
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Faculty most consistently conservative). But even business faculty split with 49% for Bush, 49% for Kerry, and 2% for Nader and other candidates in 2004. Math/science faculty voted in favor of Kerry 72%, and 24% Bush. Health faculty voted 60% for Kerry and 36% for Bush, and education faculty 75% for Kerry and 23% for Bush (See Figure 4).

In the general public, age is often a significant factor in voting patterns. Among faculty, there are some minor differences in the choice for president by age group. Voting for Bush increases by only 1% between the faculty under 35 (24%) and those between 55 and 64 years old (25%) (See Figure 5). This compares to a 13% difference between the same age groups in the general public (41% to 54%) for the 2004 election. Not only does the general public show greater differences in voting by age, but younger Americans in the general public were 17% more supportive of Bush than younger faculty. Additionally, younger faculty are more likely to vote for third party candidates, including Ralph Nader. Including Democrats and third party candidates, younger faculty tend to shift slightly leftward.

![Figure 4: Whom did you vote for in the 2004 Presidential election? by Academic Field](image)

![Figure 5: Whom did you vote for in the 2004 Presidential election? by Age](image)
Race also consistently influences voting patterns of the general public. In 2004, 58% of whites voted for Bush and 41% for Kerry. Among African-Americans, 88% voted for Kerry and 11% for Bush. Latinos voted 44% for Bush and 53% for Kerry. Asians were similar, with 44% for Bush and 56% for Kerry. However, among faculty, only 26% of whites voted for Bush, less among other races. The political ideology of the faculty seems to trump even those characteristics that, for other Americans, are stronger influences.

The influence of religious affiliation and behavior is magnified on campus. Evangelical Christians, by a ratio of more than 2-to-1, are the only faculty religious group to vote in favor of Bush: 68% versus 30% for Kerry. The closest to Evangelicals are Catholics, a distant 29% in favor of Bush and 69% for Kerry, and non-Evangelical Christians, 26% for Bush and 70% for Kerry. The drop-off between Evangelical and other Christian traditions is dramatic, but is dwarfed by that of non-Christian faiths, those with no religion and atheists. Of those who voted, 90% of faculty with no religion or atheist voted for Kerry and 8% for Bush. Jewish faculty voted 87% for Kerry and 11% for Bush, exceeding the propensity of the American Jewish public to vote Democratic (See Figure 6).

The importance of religion also influences faculty voting. Forty-five percent of those for whom religion is “very important” voted for Bush, 52% for Kerry. Bush support steadily declines with the importance of religion, with 23% of those for whom religion is “fairly important,” and 7% for whom it is “not important” voting for Bush.

![Figure 6: Whom did you vote for in the 2004 Presidential election? by Religion](image-url)
(75% and 90% for Kerry respectively). The percent of faculty who voted for Bush is also influenced by the frequency of attendance at religious services. Those who attend every week or more are over six times as likely to vote for Bush than those who rarely or never attend. Those rarely or never attending religious services voted for Kerry almost twice as much as those who attend weekly (89% to 46%). Still, faculty culture trumps the importance of religion, with only one of every three of those for whom religion is important voting for Bush. This ratio is less than the general public where over half of those for whom religion was important voted for Bush.

The divide represented in faculty voting in the 2004 presidential elections is also shown in voting for the House of Representatives. Seventy-one percent of faculty voted for the Democratic candidate, while 26% voted for the Republican candidate. This is nearly a 3-to-1 ratio in favor of the Democratic candidate, matching the split in favor of Kerry almost exactly. This affirms the supposition that the strong vote for Kerry is based on political ideology and allegiance rather than Kerry himself, or an anti-Bush vote. The support for Kerry comes from his running as a Democrat or rather that he was not a Republican.

Moreover, the core identity is much more prevalent when looking at faculty segments. Conservatives tend to be more concentrated in the business/management and health care faculty. The social science and humanities faculty show little political diversity at all. Fully 54% of the social science and humanities faculty identify as Democratic and 60% as liberal, and only 11% as Republican and 12% as conservative, a 5-to-1 ratio.

The segmentation of liberals and conservatives by discipline is also clearly demonstrated by how faculty vote in congressional elections. Humanities faculty voted Democratic over Republican for congressional candidates by a ratio of 5-to-1, and social science by 4-to-1. Only health faculty surpassed the overall percentage of faculty who voted Republican, at 36%.
In the congressional elections, religious background had a similar relationship to voting as in the presidential elections. Evangelicals were again the only group to vote heavily Republican, at 70%. Jewish professors were the least likely to vote Republican with 6%, a ratio of 15-to-1 if favor of the Democratic candidate. In the same vein, as the importance of religion to faculty goes up, so does voting for the Republican candidate.

What is possibly most interesting about how faculty vote is that, while those who identify as liberals or as Democrats nearly always vote accordingly, those who identify as conservatives or as Republicans may or may not vote for the Republican candidate. This holds true for both the presidential and congressional elections. In the presidential election, while 1% of Democrats and 1% of those identifying as liberal or very liberal voted for Bush, 13% of Republicans and 8% of those identifying as conservative or very conservative voted for Kerry (See Figures 7, 8). In the congressional elections, just under 2% of Democrats and those identifying as liberal or very liberal voted for the Republican candidate, while 8% of Republican

![Figure 7: Whom did you vote for in the 2004 presidential election? by Self-Identified Political Party](image1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Kerry</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 8: Whom did you vote for in the 2004 presidential election? by Self-Identified Political Ideology](image2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Kerry</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal/Very Liberal</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative/Very Conservative</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Figure 7: Whom did you vote for in the 2004 presidential election? by Self-Identified Political Party](image3)

- Kerry: 98%
- Bush: 1%
- Other: 1%

![Figure 8: Whom did you vote for in the 2004 presidential election? by Self-Identified Political Ideology](image4)

- Liberal/Very Liberal: 98%
- Moderate: 68%
- Conservative/Very Conservative: 89%
and 12% of those identifying as conservative or very conservative voted for the Democratic candidate.

This variance is not reflected in voting patterns among similarly self-identifying faculty. Among those independent faculty who voted in the 2004 presidential election, only 27% voted for Bush while 66% voted for Kerry, a 2.5-to-1 ratio. Among those faculty who identified as moderate/middle-of-the-road, 27% voted for Bush and 68% for Kerry, 2.5-to-1 ratio.

The liberal tendency of self-identified independent and moderate faculty is also illustrated in congressional voting. Sixty-six percent of independent faculty voted for the Democratic candidate and 28% for the Republican, more than a 2-to-1 ratio. Among those who identified as moderate/middle-of-the-road, 64% voted Democratic and 32% Republican, a 2-to-1 ratio. Self-identified independent and moderate/middle-of-the-road faculty vote nothing like their counterparts in the general public. First, they are more likely to vote, and second, they are more likely to vote Democratic.

The importance of religion and religious observance have strong bearings on the political leanings of faculty. Those faculty with the highest religiosity and observance are the most conservative and most likely to vote Republican. Moreover, Evangelical Christians and, to a lesser extent, Catholics and other Christians tend to be slightly more conservative and Republican than their Jewish and non-religious colleagues. The faculty sample surveyed for this monograph includes those employed at private, denominational schools, nearly all of which are Christian-oriented. These faculty are more religious and likely to include higher percentages of Evangelical, Catholic and other Christians than both public and private non-denominational colleges and universities. Denominational faculty are a deviation from the norm among most faculty. It is worthwhile, then, to explore the political ideology of faculty excluding denominational faculty.
The reality of campus life is that certain schools within a university wield little influence over the student body as a whole, namely the business and medical schools. While most students will encounter liberal arts classes in their core requirements, these do not usually include business and health courses. Similar to the denominational faculty, faculty in business and health are more conservative and Republican than other professors. The question is, then, what would a liberal arts student at a non-denominational school encounter in terms of faculty political ideology? Excluding these three categories of faculty—denominational, business and health—the percentage of Republicans drops from 16% to 13%. The percentage of conservative faculty drops from 17% to 12%. A liberal arts student will encounter a professor to the right of the political spectrum in about one out of every ten classes.

The fact that faculty are three to four times more likely to identify as a liberal or a Democrat combined with the evidence showing a political spectrum in which moderates/independents tend leftward in voting patterns illustrates a strong political belief and behavioral system among faculty. Does this political belief and behavior influence views about social, economic and political issues?
Among the most extreme accusations leveled at college faculty is that they are a fifth column rooting for America’s downfall. Marc J. Rauch, in an article entitled, “America-hating Professors,” wrote of faculty: “These are anti-American, Jew-hating, Christian-hating socialists that desperately wish to see an end to our country. There’s no reason to mince words; they are enemies of the United States.”

This image derives from the “fringe” faculty who seem to represent the views of their peers, when they do not. For example, when asked to respond to the statement “The attacks against the United States on September 11th are justified by legitimate grievances against United States policies and practices,” fully 95% of faculty disagreed, the most overwhelming response in the survey. About 3% agreed, and 2% were not sure. The 3% translates to possibly over 18,000 faculty across the United States, more than enough to make themselves heard on campuses throughout the United States or in one media outlet or another, so that they may seem to represent faculty as a whole. Of course, attention focuses on them, because most Americans are dumbfounded (and outraged) that any faculty would hold these views, much less 18,000 individuals. But they are a tiny minority, and their extreme views are not held by American
college faculty as a whole. In fact, they are far less likely than the American public to justify the terror attacks. A total of 14% of Americans agreed that the attacks were justified, 77% disagreed and 7% were unsure.

While the vast majority of faculty do not fit the mold of the subversive anti-American, they do exhibit a high propensity to distrust and criticize America. For example, while 95% of faculty do not feel the 9-11 attacks were justified, 54% of faculty believe that the United States policies in the Middle East are at least partially responsible for the growth of Islamic militancy (See Figure 9). While 64% see political corruption/oppression in the militant’s home countries as a cause, over half list United States policies. About 29% also listed the spread of Western culture, while 25% named the Islamic religion itself. Younger faculty, under 35, are the most likely to name the United States, 60%, as are social science and humanities faculty, also 60%. Faculty as a whole are two times as likely to blame the United States rather than Islam itself and the humanities faculty are
three times as likely to cite the United States versus Islam itself. Faculty who identify as Democrat or independent are far more likely to cite the United States as a cause of Islamic militancy, 65% and 54% respectively, versus 23% of Republicans. Similarly, 66% of those who voted for Kerry versus 18% of those who voted for Bush cite the United States as a cause of Islamic militancy. On the other hand, 52% of Evangelical faculty list Islam itself, as do 56% of conservatives, and 50% of Republicans.

While faculty clearly reject terrorism against the United States, a majority are willing to blame America itself as a cause of terrorism. These two views can become conflated. It may be difficult to distinguish between citing America as a primary cause of Islamic militancy, while at the same time unequivocally rejecting the violence associated with this militancy. Faculty who explain the causes of terrorism against the United States in terms of provocation may sound like they are justifying it. Indeed, faculty may be criticizing America while at the same time rejecting Islamic violence. They are not mutually exclusive, but linking America as a cause of militancy may sound like an excuse for terrorism.

In response to a similar question, almost half of faculty partially blame America for problems in the Middle East: 47% agreed with the statement: “Many of the problems that now exist in Middle Eastern countries can be traced to misguided American policies” and 42% disagreed. In the general public, 37% agreed and 51% disagreed. Looking at faculty by discipline, the disparity is greater: 58% of humanities faculty agreed versus 28% of business faculty. The view is held by 66% of liberal faculty versus 15% of conservative faculty, and 58% of Kerry voters versus 13% of Bush voters (See Figures 10, 11, 12). In contrast, 46% of liberals in the general public agreed that United States policy has caused many of the problems in the Middle East, while 32% of conservatives agreed. Regarding the source of Middle East turmoil, and the reasons for terrorism, a significant portion of faculty, but not all, are clearly critical of Ameri-
Behaviors and Beliefs of College Faculty

Faculty are not only distrustful of American actions in regard to terror abroad, but also at home. A significant majority, 64%, of faculty feel the powers of the USA Patriot Act should be reduced. Moreover, only 5% feel the Patriot Act should be strengthened, a definitive 13-to-1 ratio against strengthening it versus reducing it. The remaining faculty either do not want the Patriot Act changed, 20%, or answered that they were not sure, 11% (See Figure 13).

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While faculty as a whole support reducing the Patriot Act by over a 3-to-1 margin, significant in its own right, groupthink within the humanities is almost unanimous. Eighty percent of humanities
faculty want to reduce the powers of the Patriot Act, but even more conclusively, less than 1% want to see it strengthened. The only academic disciplines in which a significant percentage did not want to reduce the Patriot Act powers were health at 40% and business/management at 49%. However, even among these faculty, those wanting to strengthen, 7% for both, do not deviate much from overall faculty. Health and business faculty are more likely to support the Patriot Act as is at 29% and 34%, respectively.

Religious, political, and party identification are also predictors of how faculty regard the Patriot Act. Other than conservatives and Republicans, 10% of Catholics and 11% of Evangelical Christians are the only groups to register double-digit percentages in favor of strengthening the Patriot Act. Moreover, among Evangelicals, 39% support the Patriot Act as is and 33% want it reduced. Interestingly, it is also the Evangelicals who registered the most “not sure” responses, 17%. Thirty percent of those for whom religion is very important want the Patriot Act left unchanged and 47% wanted its powers reduced, and among those attending religious services weekly or more, 33% want is left unchanged, 45% want it reduced and 9% want it strengthened.

However, it is political identification and party affiliation that are the greatest determinants in how faculty regard the Patriot Act. Liberals and Democrats, 87% and 83% respectively, want it reduced, 4% and 7% want it left unchanged and only 1% for each want to see it strengthened. Clearly, among the Left on campus, the Patriot Act garners almost no support, but plenty of disapproval. Compare this
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to conservatives and Republicans, who at 18% and 17% respectively want to strengthen the Patriot Act, at 17% and 22% want it reduced and at 53% and 48% want it left unchanged. About half of both conservatives and Republicans support the Patriot Act as is and are 17 to 18 times more likely to want to strengthen it than liberals and Democrats. A total of 65% of Republicans and 71% of conservatives want to either strengthen the Patriot Act or leave it as is. The issues of security, personal freedom and privacy seem to hit the core divide between the Right and Left on campus.

Opposition to the Patriot Act may be attributed to a variety of factors. We may surmise that distrust for what the government intends to do with the increased powers under the Patriot Act is likely to weigh in heavily. The fear of the abrogation of civil liberties, which is a probable interpretation at the core of faculty opposition to the Patriot Act, depends upon the assumption that these powers will be abused. In some cases, this assumption is unanimous, such as at the University of California, Berkeley’s Academic Senate meeting:

By a 105-0 vote at a special meeting Thursday evening, senate members condemned the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) for provisions that, in the words of the resolution, “violate basic civil rights of students, faculty, and staff of the University of California at Berkeley.”

The faculty called on Chancellor Robert M. Berdahl and his successor to “take every legally protected step to challenge and resist” any law-enforcement actions under that act that violate civil rights or civil liberties, citing particularly the exercise of free speech and religious activities protected by the First Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizure.26

Faculty distrust for American government policy is represented in responses to other, more abstract questions about America’s role
in the world. Among all faculty, 59% agreed, 22% disagreed and 19% were not sure that “the United States does more to help people of developing nations than it does to harm them.” Within the general public, 72% agreed, 19% disagreed and 9% were unsure. Seemingly, while faculty are critical of many components of the United States’ global role, they are supportive of the overall effect the United States has on the world’s developing nations. This “positive American” tilt is clustered in certain faculty segments.

The clusters follow the same pattern as in other questions, often determined by academic discipline, religiosity, and political identification, though the polarization on this question is extreme. While 72% of health faculty agreed that “the United States does more to help people of developing nations than it does to harm them,” and 72% of business faculty agreed, only 42% of humanities faculty agreed. Among Evangelical Christians, 84%, agreed with the statement, while only 7% disagreed. Compare this to atheists, 45% of whom agreed, 36% disagreed, and 19% were unsure. The importance of religion weighed heavily as well, with 71% of those for whom religion is very important who agreed that “the United States does more to help people of developing nations than it does to harm them” versus only 47% of those for whom religion was not important (See Figure 14). Likewise, 71% of those that attend religious services weekly agreed versus 48% for those who rarely attend.

The differences among faculty are even more stark regarding political self-identification

![Figure 14: The United States does more to help people in developing nations than it does to harm them. by Importance of Religion](image-url)
and party affiliation. Eighty-nine percent of conservative and 88% of Republican faculty agreed that “the United States does more to help people of developing nations than it does to harm them,” and only 4% and 5%, respectively, disagreed. Notably, for both conservatives and Republicans, only 7% answered not sure, indicating a much stronger conviction in their opinions regarding this statement than other faculty. Meanwhile, only 41% of liberal and 50% of Democratic faculty agreed and 35% and 29% respectively disagreed, with 24% and 22% were not sure. This division is highlighted when looking at the data according to presidential voting patterns. While 93% of Bush voters agreed and only 2% disagreed with the statement, 49% of Kerry voters agreed and only 2% disagreed with the statement, 49% of Kerry voters agreed and 28% disagreed.

There are, however, other considerations. Age, though a non-factor for most questions, does play a part regarding views of the United States’ role in developing nations. Less than half, 46%, of faculty 35 years and under agreed that “the United States does more to help people of developing nations than it does to harm them.” This percentage steadily increases by age, reaching 69% of those over 65.

On the whole, United States college faculty agreed with the statement, “America has made a contribution to the world by expanding freedom to more and more people.” This is among the most positive views of America by faculty, an opinion held by a large majority of 68%, or more than two of every three, with 23% who disagreed. Responses from the general public were 75% who agreed and 20% who disagreed. Male faculty are more
positive, 73% versus 61% of women faculty. Younger faculty are less positive—59% of those under 35 agreed versus about 69% of those 35 years and older (See Figure 15). As with most beliefs on campus, differences among disciplines are notable. For example, over 75% of business and health faculty believe America has expanded freedom around the world, compared to 56% of humanities faculty, almost a 20% difference. Still, this is among the most positive views of the American role in the world held by humanities faculty.

Faculty who identify as Evangelical endorse this statement by a huge majority, 87% versus 76% of non-evangelical Christians, 73% of Catholics, and 54% of those with no religion, or atheists. Similarly, 80% of those for whom religion is very important believe in America’s contribution to world freedom versus 54% for whom religion is not very important (See Figure 16). The most stark differences are presented by political ideology and identification: 53% who self-identify as liberal versus 95% who identify as conservative; or 59% who identify as Democrat versus 90% who identify as Republican believe the United States has made a contribution by expanding freedom (See Figures 17, 18). Virtually all faculty who voted for Bush in 2004, 97%, endorse the statement as opposed 59% of those who voted for Kerry (See Figure 19). Significant percentages of the overall faculty, but more importantly, concentrated majorities within certain academic disciplines and religious and political identities are either unsure America plays a positive global role, or reject the idea altogether.

Faculty exhibit distrust for America when asked which two of a list of countries are “the greatest threats to international stability.” North Korea was very much in the news at the time of the survey (as it is today) and 70% named North Korea as a threat. The most interesting response to this question was that 29% listed the United States as the second choice to North Korea, leading by a slim margin the third choice, Iran, at 27%. China was named by 19% of faculty, Iraq 13%, Israel 12%, Pakistan 8%, Syria 7%, and Russia 4%
Behaviors and Beliefs of College Faculty

(See Figure 20). Faculty see the United States as a greater threat to world stability than Russia by a ratio of 7-to-1. Nearly half of humanities faculty, 46%, see the United States as a threat to international stability as do 34% of social science faculty. Faculty attitudes
toward America look very similar to the attitudes of Europeans. A recent poll for the Financial Times reported that 36% of Europeans identify the United States as the greatest threat to international stability.28

About 12% of faculty see Israel as a great threat to international stability. Looked at another way, 41% of faculty see the United States and Israel combined as the greatest threats, compared to China and Russia combined, 23%. For humanities faculty, 56% list the United States and Israel, compared to 20% who name China and Russia combined, or 41% who list China, Russia, and Iran combined.

Faculty who identify as atheists are most likely to list the United States as a threat, 47%, and those who identify as liberal, 45%. Faculty Democrats are more likely to name America than Republicans by a factor of almost 10-to-1, 38% to 4%. Similarly, about 20% of those who identify as atheists or no religion name Israel, as do 15% of liberals versus 5% of conservatives.

About 65% of atheists name the United States and Israel combined and about 59% of liberals. Similarly 39% of those who voted for Kerry named the United States versus 4% who voted for Bush, a factor of 10-to-1. About 14% of those who voted for Kerry named Israel (53% for United States and Israel combined) versus 5% who voted for Bush (10% for United States and Israel combined).

Faculty, despite this belief that American policy is one of the primary sources of global instability, Islamic extremism, and Middle East problems in general, tend to regard America’s human rights record positively. When asked to rank a list of countries according
to their human rights record in the last five years, faculty tended to have a positive image of the United States. On a scale of 0-10, with ten being the best, 47% of faculty ranked the United States record on human rights 8-10. Another 30% ranked it 6 or 7 (a total of 76% ranking the United States above 5). About 23% ranked it 5 or less, including 34% of the humanities faculty. Of those who identified as liberal, only 27% ranked the United States 8-10, another 36% 6-7, and 35% 5 or less. On the other hand, 89% of conservatives ranked the United States 8-10 and only 7% ranked the United States record on human rights 0-5. Similar patterns were found by political affiliation and voting patterns. Only 35% of Kerry voters ranked the United States 8-10, while 29% ranked it 0-5, versus 3% of Bush voters who ranked it 0-5. While the faculty on a whole are positive, a significant minority, those who most embrace liberalism, are more critical.

Sometimes, however, criticism of America is not overt, but rather implied through comparisons. For example, faculty see the human rights record of France in the past five years as slightly better than that of the United States. Those who are conservative, Republican, and voted for Bush do not see it that way at all, ranking the United States as stronger than France on human rights. One can conjecture that faculty might see some other European nations in a more favorable light than the United States. Compared to countries with obvious problems in human rights, such as China, Cuba, Turkey, and Egypt, faculty view America very positively. The United States is not seen as problematic on human rights by most faculty, just not as good as France.
A TRUST OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND MISTRUST OF AMERICAN UNILATERALISM

Faculty, on the whole, are committed “globalists” as opposed to unilateralists. They favor international institutions such as the United Nations International Court of Justice even if it curtails America’s ability to act. By more than a 3-to-1 margin, 66% to 19%, faculty agreed with the statement: “Supporting institutions like the International Court of Justice is the right policy even if it would limit American’s options.” Humanities faculty endorse this idea by a factor of more than 5-to-1, 73% to 14%. In contrast, only 36% of the general public agreed with such internationalism and 42% disagreed, with 21% unsure.

Liberal faculty support global institutions over United States autonomy by margins of 86% to 3%, a factor of almost 30-to-1. Liberal Americans do not come close to liberal faculty, with only 42% supporting international institutions over American interests. Conservative faculty reject the idea (although not as strongly as liberals support it): only 23% agreed and 64% disagreed (See Figure 21). Similarly, 83% of faculty Democrats agreed and only 4% disagreed, a factor of 20-to-1, while 30% of Republicans agreed and 52% disagreed (See Figure 22). Evangelical faculty are about evenly split, while atheists and those with no religion endorse globalism by a
factor of 10-to-1, 80% to 8%. Kerry voters also endorsed international institutions that may limit American’s options by 81% to 5%, while Bush voters reject the idea, 25% agreed and 57% disagreed (See Figure 23).

Internationalism, and with it an aversion to impose American will on others, is at the core of faculty ideology and, in some cases, produces responses that are somewhat surprising. Consider faculty’s response to the statement, “There are no moral values that can be applied across all cultures, societies, and nations.” A total of 81% disagreed, 17% agreed and 2% were not sure. The general public also disagreed, though not as strongly, 66% disagreed and 26% agreed. Clearly, faculty believe that universal morals do
indeed exist; rights and wrongs cross national and cultural boundaries. However, when presented with specific scenarios that test this moral compass, faculty are significantly less absolute in their willingness to endorse measures for America to address international problems unilaterally. Perhaps such action directly conflicts with faculty allegiance to internationalism. Or, maybe they believe America cannot address certain problems alone, or it is not up to America to correct all the world’s ills, a view also taken by some liberals and conservatives alike. Still another explanation is that faculty take the view that coalition building only fails from lack of effort or commitment.

Faculty were asked, “If actions by the United Nations or others fail to reduce the ethnic violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan, would you favor sending United States military troops?” When the survey was administered, the situation in Darfur had been categorized by Colin Powell, the United States Secretary of State at the time, as “genocide.”29 Forty percent of faculty said yes to American military intervention, 49% said no, and 12% were not sure (See Figure 24). Interestingly, liberal faculty were more likely to say yes than conservative faculty, 45% to 36%, but neither a majority endorsement for action.

If faculty do indeed believe that morality extends beyond borders, why would most faculty not endorse acting if the UN and others have failed to achieve progress? Do they not trust America’s utility, capacity, or motives? Do they believe that America should try harder, until success, at creating an international coalition? Do they think that the risk of inter-

**Figure 24: If actions by the United Nations or others fail to reduce the ethnic violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan, would you favor sending United States military troops?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely Not</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably Not</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
vention is potentially more damaging to the United States than the Darfur situation? Is American unilateralism unacceptable, even in the case of genocide?

Only half of those who agreed that morals and values are universal would be willing to take action unilaterally in Sudan. At least 40% of those who say universal morality exists do not want to United States to take action. While there are certainly many other considerations faculty may weigh, a dominant determinant is likely to be faculty’s aversion to unilateral American action under most, if not all circumstances. Even as the last course of action, it is not acceptable to a majority of college faculty for America to act alone to save the lives of others in Darfur.

Similarly, when asked, “Each society or nation has a right to its own cultural practices—for example, arranged marriages of girls 12 to 14,” 51% agreed, 37% disagreed, and 12% were not sure. This is one of the few questions that showed little difference by religious identity or political affiliation. How are faculty responses reconciled with their belief that some morals are universal? There is a 30% difference: 51% say nations and cultures have a right to their own practices (including arranged marriages for adolescent girls), and 81% believe there are certain morals and values that apply to all societies. Do faculty believe specifically that arranged marriages for teen girls are not among the objectionable practices worldwide? What principles do apply? Given the strong commitment to women’s rights on campus, it is somewhat surprising that 80% of faculty believe in some universal moral principles, and the protection of 12-year-old girls from arranged marriages was not one of them (even among women faculty, who were only 4% more likely to say that other cultures should not arrange marriages for young girls).

When asked, “If other nations are unwilling to join America in fighting terrorism around the globe, then America must go at it alone,” 58% of faculty disagreed and 34% agreed. In contrast, 56% of the general public is willing to endorse unilateral action and
39% disagreed. Unilateralism is one of the few factors where male and female faculty differed significantly: 43% of men would go at it alone versus only 22% of women faculty (51% of men disagreed versus 69% of women). Nearly half of business and management faculty agreed, 49%, versus 28% of social science and humanities faculty. Only 13% of liberal faculty and 19% of Democrats agreed that America should fight terrorism alone if it must, versus 78% of conservatives and 77% of Republicans (See Figures 25, 26). In the general public, 42% and 40% of liberals and Democrats, respectively, agreed while 72% and 76% of conservatives and Republicans, respectively, agreed with unilateral action. Among faculty, only 24% of atheists and those with no religion agreed, versus 56% of Evangelical Christians. About 18% of faculty Kerry voters agreed that America should fight terrorism alone if it must, versus 79% of Bush voters (See Figure 27). Support for American unilateralism increases with age, where those over 55 years old are 10% more likely to endorse action than those under 35 years old (See Figure 28).

The strong endorsement of internationalism is also seen in the 70% of faculty who agreed with the statement, “I would prefer a
United Nations with more authority over resolving international disputes including disputes involving the United States.” Only 22% disagreed, and 8% were not sure (See Figure 29). Sixty-one percent of the general public agreed, 31% disagreed. Women faculty endorsed the idea more than men, 76% to 67%. A slight majority of business faculty endorsed the idea, 55%, lower than any other academic discipline. Liberal faculty agreed with the statement 88% to 6%, a ratio of 15-to-1, and Democrats 86% to 9%. On the other hand, 67% of conservatives disagreed and only 28% agreed. Political ideology and party affiliation did not line up exactly for conservatives and Republicans on this question. Forty percent of Repub-
licans agreed with the statement and 54% disagreed. Evangelical faculty were about evenly split, 44% agreed and 47% disagreed, while those with no religion or atheists favored more United Nations authority by 82% to 13%. Over 84% of Kerry voters agreed and only 9% disagreed, while 32% of Bush voters agreed, and 62% disagreed. Global institutions are wholly endorsed by Kerry voters, but not wholly rejected by Bush voters.

The survey also asked, “Even if most countries support a particular international agreement which the United States disagrees with, the United States must do what is in its own interest.” This question further tests feelings toward American unilateralism and finds that while faculty are more likely to reject than accept the idea, they do not do so overwhelmingly. Overall, 36% agreed that the United States must act in its own interest, 52% disagreed and 12% were not sure. However, in contrast to the public, 67% of Americans agreed and only 25% disagreed with American unilateral action. Forty-three percent of male faculty agreed and 47% disagreed, compared to only 26% of females who agreed and 60% who disagreed, a stronger gender difference than in most other questions. Likewise, age also plays a factor. Thirty-six percent of faculty between 45 and 54 years old support American unilateralism and 52% oppose, while 32% of faculty below 45 years old support American unilateralism and 59% oppose. Forty percent of faculty 55 years and older support America’s right to “go it alone” and 49% oppose. Aversion to unilateralism is strongest among the youngest professors.

Rejection of American unilateralism is most heavily represented, predictably, within the humanities, 29% agreed and 62% disagreed with the statement, “Even if most countries support a particular international agreement which the United States disagrees with, the United States must do what is in its own interest.” On the other hand, business faculty support American unilateralism 47% to 40%, the only discipline where more faculty support than oppose this form of United States unilateralism.
Religious identification and importance are also significant factors. Only 22% of those faculty with no religion, 23% of Jewish faculty, and 25% of atheists agreed, while, 66%, 61% and 69%, respectively, disagreed. On the contrary, 41% of Catholics and 59% of Evangelicals support American unilateralism with 49% of Catholics and only 30% of Evangelicals opposing. This split is represented in religious importance as well, with 49% of those for whom religion is very important and only 22% of those for whom religion is not important supporting America’s right to do what is in its interest (See Figure 30).

The most dramatic split on this question corresponds to political party and ideology self-identification. While 79% of conservatives agreed with the statement, only 16% of liberals agreed. Likewise, 75% of Republicans, and only 20% of Democrats agreed (See Figures 31, 32). Interestingly, moderates and independents actually represent a middle ground on this question. Moderates agreed 44% to 43%, while 39% of independents agreed and 48% disagreed. Dif-
ferentiation by presidential vote, however, reflects the divisions between Democrats and Republicans where 21% of Kerry voters agreed and 67% disagreed while 78% of Bush voters agreed and 14% disagreed (See Figure 33).

**Figure 32**: Even if most other countries support a particular international agreement which the United States disagrees with, the United States must do what is in its own interest.

*by Self-Identified Political Ideology*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 33**: Even if most other countries support a particular international agreement which the United States disagrees with, the United States must do what is in its own interest.

*by Faculty 2004 Presidential Vote*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kerry</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Skeptical about Business, Global Corporations and Capitalism

While faculty are globalists when it comes to international politics, they are not so supportive of global business. Only 38% agreed with the statement, “People in developing countries benefit more that they lose from investment of global corporations,” 37% disagreed and 25% were not sure (See Figure 34). The general public was more supportive of global business, 54% agreed with the benefits of global corporations and 28% disagreed. Even solely among liberal Americans, 44% agreed, and among Democrats, 52% agreed, both stronger endorsements of global corporations than that of faculty as a whole. Those faculty who identify as conservative and Republican strongly endorse global corporations as a plus for developing countries. About 66% of Republicans agreed and only 16% disagreed about the benefits of global corporations while 68% of conservatives agreed and only 14% disagreed. Liberal and Democratic faculty are the opposite—only 24% of liberals endorse

Figure 34: People in developing countries benefit more than they lose from involvement of global corporations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
global corporations’ benefits and 52% disagreed. Similarly 27% of Democrats agreed and 44% disagreed. Bush voters endorse the benefits of global corporations for developing countries by 70% to 13%. Kerry voters are the opposite, only 28% agreed and 45% disagreed.

Over half of humanities faculty (52%) rejected the idea that people in developing countries benefit from global corporations. They are followed by social science faculty of which 42% disagreed with the statement, while 38% agreed. All other disciplines agreed more than they disagreed, the strongest of which was business, of which 60% agreed and 26% disagreed (See Figure 35). Criticism of global corporations is greater among younger faculty. Only 29% of faculty under 35 years old agreed with the statement, 54% disagreed, and 17% were unsure. Among those 35 years old and above, 39% agreed, 35% disagreed, and 26% were unsure (See Figure 36).

Criticism of international trade and multinational corporations is part and parcel of the dominant ideology among faculty. Faculty were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, “International trade agreements...
have favored large corporations to the disadvantage of people and businesses in less developed countries.” Overall, 73% of faculty agreed, 16% disagreed and 11% answered that they were “not sure.” Variables such as age and gender revealed little difference. In the general public, 63% of Americans agreed and 23% disagreed that international trade harms developing countries. The responses of the business/management faculty, of which 40% agreed and 50% disagreed with the statement, were the clearest exception from the dominant opinion among faculty. Of humanities faculty, 81% agreed that international trade agreements are unfair, while only 9% disagreed. Seventy-five percent of social science faculty agreed and 17% disagreed. Education faculty, who often fall in line with social science and humanities faculty, registered the highest endorsement of the statement criticizing international trade agreements, with 87% agreeing and 9% disagreeing (See Figure 37).

Religious affiliation and the importance of religion affect feelings about international trade agreements. Evangelical Christians were most likely to support free trade agreements, 24% disagreed that they are a disadvantage to developing countries, and 64% agreed. For those who answered religion is “very important”, 65% agreed and 22% disagreed. Likewise, among those attending religious services every week or more, 64% agreed and 24% disagreed.

Party affiliation and political self-identification, however,
have the strongest connection to feelings about international trade agreements. Forty-two percent of conservative faculty agreed with the statement while 40% disagreed. This compares to 87% of liberals who agreed and 6% who disagreed (See Figure 38). Forty-five percent of Republicans agreed and 37% disagreed, compared to 84% of Democrats who agreed and 8% who disagreed (See Figure 39). Notably, independents and moderates do not fall in between liberals and conservative and Democrats and Republicans. Instead, they tend toward the opinions of the liberals and Democrats, 69% of moderates agreed and 19% disagreed, while 73% of independents agreed and 18% disagreed. This tilting toward the liberal/Democrat opinion is reflective of the patterns in voting, where moderates and independents look much more like liberals and Democrats than conservatives and Republicans.

Presidential choice is also an indicator of feelings toward international trade agreements, at least it is if one voted for Kerry: 83% of Kerry voters view international trade agreements negatively and only 9% view them positively. However, those who voted for Bush
are split, 43% agreed and 38% disagreed (See Figure 40). Criticism of business is part of the faculty ideology that reaches across all faculty divisions, even those of political ideology and party: about half of conservative and Republican faculty are critical of corporations (as are most Americans, with over half of nearly all types of Americans agreeing).

While faculty are distinctly distrustful of large corporations, international trade agreements, and American economic intervention around the globe, this negativity is not as strong regarding capitalism on the whole as a developmental strategy. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement, “Although capitalism helped bring prosperity to this country, it is not well suited to accomplish the same today in developing countries,” 36% of faculty agreed and 48% disagreed and 17% were not sure, a total of 53% who were either negative or unsure about the benefits of capitalism (See Figure 41). Some might argue (others may not) that trade agreements and international corporations are essential to the expansion of capitalism. Faculty may reject this connection or see them as necessary (or unnecessary) evils that capitalism includes. Either way, questions regarding the
benefits of capitalism do not elicit the same skewed responses that characterize many other faculty views; however, the 36% of faculty who agreed represent a significant constituency who reject capitalism as a means to prosperity in developing countries. Interestingly, support for capitalism was lower in the general public, 48% agreed and 38% disagreed with the statement.

Responses about capitalism showed some variation by demographic factors. While 33% of men agreed and 56% disagreed with the statement, “Although capitalism helped bring prosperity to this country, it is not well suited to accomplish the same today in developing countries,” 42% of women agreed and 35% disagreed (See Figure 42). With regard to race, 33% of white faculty agreed and 50% disagreed, while 63% of minority faculty agreed and 27% disagreed.

Political self-identification and party affiliation have proven to be strong factors in determining faculty responses to most questions. Usually, this is demonstrated by a strong liberal/Democratic unity in which the great majority of liberals and Democrats share the same views. The conservative/Republican faculty, on the other hand, often do not agree with each other, as shown by significant percentages falling on either side of a question. However, regarding the statement, “Although capitalism helped bring prosperity to this country, it is not well suited to accomplish the same today in developing countries,” 74% of Republicans and 79% of conservatives disagreed, a fairly strong showing of ideological unity among the faculty Right.
Conversely, liberals and Democrats do not hold a dominant view regarding capitalism. Liberals disagreed, 34%, and agreed, 45%, while Democrats disagreed, 38%, and agreed, 43% (See Figures 43, 44). The same is true when looking at responses by presidential vote—42% of Kerry voters agreed, 38% disagreed and 20% were unsure while only 15% of Bush voters agreed, 77% disagreed and 8% were unsure (See Figure 45). While the conservative and Republican minority certainly holds a strong positive opinion of capitalism as a model for development, the liberal and Democratic majority is more ambivalent.
CONCLUSION

It would be an exaggeration to say that college faculty are monolithic in their political identification and behavior, but they are severely skewed. While a small conservative/Republican minority exists on campus, it is not always aligned with the political identity and behavior of conservatives and Republicans in the American public as a whole.

Faculty do not represent the political diversity of America. Should they? Some may argue that universities need to be institutions that are different from the society as a whole, representing cutting-edge political, social, and cultural critiques of the status quo. Colleges and the faculty who teach in them should challenge existing norms and be leaders in creating ideas that lead to a more progressive and healthy society. Yet how one defines the status quo is problematic. Is it which political party is in power? The general tilt of the Supreme Court? The social norms of the day? All of these shift over time. Should universities be counter-weights, and if so, are they capable of shifting on a similar timetable?

Moreover, is liberalism, at least defined by allegiance to the Democratic Party (even if one self-identifies as a moderate or an independent) really progressive, challenging the status quo or existing norms? Is 1960s liberalism necessarily a path to intellectual growth and creativity after forty years of dominance on campus?
Perhaps those faculty who believe they are challenging their students (and their fellow faculty) to think critically do so confined with their own proscribed limits.

Faculty who are Democratic/liberal tend to be more uniform in their political beliefs and behavior. The Republican/conservative core tends to be more divided on many issues. Perhaps faculty culture is so strong that it overrides the political partisanship of the conservatives at times, and their academic identity is the strongest. Or perhaps the conservatives are more open-minded and thoughtful. That is, they think beyond the rigidity of their own self-identified labels and political affiliations. It may be a combination of both: faculty culture may be so strong it trumps even political differences on some issues and conservative faculty are simply less rigid in their beliefs than liberal faculty.

The questions in this survey find wide divergence on some issues while others reflect a kind of orthodoxy. Many of the faculty travel in herds. This is to be expected to some degree. All institutions, organizations, and social networks develop cultures, norms and common values. This is not necessarily negative or undesirable. But faculty in particular are supposed to represent a broad range of ideas and philosophies so that students are exposed to the widest array of intellectual approaches and frameworks. A common political ideology does not necessarily mean that the university does not offer such an array. It just means that political influence, intentionally, or unintentionally, seeps in as well. Moreover, universities promote themselves as providing “total” campus experiences, where lectures, workshops, and other outside the classroom events are as important as those inside the classroom. Students would have to seek hard, or run hard, to escape from liberal culture.

Groupthink and behavior can create a dangerous milieu for teaching and scholarship. A pervasive political ideology and culture on campus is by nature unsavory, even if there are dissenters representing a minority view. Higher education should not be dom-
inhibited by liberalism or any political ideology and culture. It would be equally unfortunate if conservatism or Buddhism or Evangelical religion were the dominant ideologies on campus. Something is amiss when any ideology takes root to the extent that political liberalism and Democratic party identification have among college faculty.

As a result, liberal arts has assumed a whole new meaning, one that does disservice to the more honorable mission intended by those who envisioned a broad immersion in many disciplines, modes of inquiry, and ways to understand society, the world, and the universe. Of course, some might suggest that the political ideologies and behavior of faculty have nothing to do with the classroom and do not influence students or scholarship. But faculty tend to teach what they believe, some intentionally, some not. Students can seek out the business, health, and a small minority of other faculty for varied opinions. But the social sciences and humanities are almost monolithic in their liberalism.

**The Role of Faculty in America**

More and more faculty believe it is their right, indeed, their responsibility to teach from their own, personal ideology. Is this what students and the public at large expect of faculty? The primary role of faculty (as seen by the public) is to educate students. Faculty are charged with teaching content and modes of inquiry to students in a wide variety of fields. They are also role models, counselors and mentors to their students, to varying degrees. Faculty are also expected to engage in scholarly and productive research to benefit both the campus and American society at large (although many faculty may see research as their primary responsibility and teaching second). Whether the product is a new technology, gene mapping, or political analysis, university faculty are expected to contribute to an ever-growing body of knowledge that advances American society and the world. All of these roles should be egalitarian in their
benefit, meaning that they serve all members of the American public, either as students, parents, or simply citizens.

The public not only has expectations about what the role of faculty should be, but also how they should fulfill their role: by embracing objective scholarship and offering instruction that is free of political, personal, or other ideologies. The pursuit of truth, open debate, and freedom to explore ideas absent of intellectual bias are core values of higher education. Indeed, the public expects what universities themselves have long promoted.

However, if many faculty see one of their primary roles as counterweights to government, media, and popular opinion, they may seek to keep America honest by maintaining constant watch and playing the part of critic. The pursuit of truth has come to be defined as the “alternative” view to the normative majority of the general public, the presumption being, of course, that the majority needs corrective guidance. Faculty may see offsetting rising conservatism as central to their purpose. At least the large number of liberal faculty might think so.

If Americans expect quality instruction from faculty, regardless of the politics of the day, and expect honest scholarship to drive the creation of knowledge for the benefit of all, how should we regard faculty’s potential role as a ballast in the political arena? Is it possible to adhere to principles of unbiased research and honest scholarship if one is at the same time directed by political concerns? If the relevancy of faculty partially lies in their opposition to the status quo, what happens when the political winds change? Do they become at least partially obsolete?

One may even agree with the political counterweight that faculty seek to create, but at the same time understand how potentially damaging to higher education such an allegiance among faculty may be. This, of course, does not even take into account the diminishing returns on intellectual diversity when one is surrounded by like minds. Even if faculty rightly play the role of counterweight,
does the political allegiance that develops undermine the basic purpose of the university?

The greatest political and social achievements often come through the mixing of ideas and the debates that surround contradicting ideas. A counterweight is, almost by definition, the embodiment of Newton’s Third Law that every action has an equal and opposite reaction. If the faculty is right that groupthink in government or the general society is bad for America, then is faculty groupthink equally bad for higher education? While simplified, the question is an interesting one. It goes to the heart of why so much emphasis in the past has been placed on the tenets of honesty, lack of bias, and adherence to the highest standards of teaching and research in academia.

The recent debates over and in some cases, overt rejection of, long standing standards of objectivity for faculty are, therefore, salient to the discussion of the politics of faculty. If, indeed, faculty expectations of themselves contradict those set by society, either faculty must change, or the expectations of society must change. Otherwise, an ongoing conflict can be expected. University of California President Richard Atkinson recently declared that a professor should not be expected to remain unbiased in his or her teaching. The university instituted changes to guidelines on academic freedom stating that, “The quality of scholarship is assessed by its content, not by the motivations that led to its production. Because academic freedom is concerned with the quality of scholarship, it does not distinguish between ‘interested’ and ‘disinterested’ scholarship. It distinguishes between competent and incompetent scholarship.” The faculty role has been redefined so that professors might freely infuse their teaching and scholarship with personal views. All the more problematic, since so many faculty hold similar political views.

While elections come every two or four years, tenure lasts a lifetime. As a result, political slant infused into faculty ranks long
outlasts the bias that the influx of politically likeminded professors intended to combat. The protest culture of the 1960s and 1970s has extended long past the causes they originally championed and much has been made of the efforts of faculty to reinvigorate the passion and reuse the tactics of the past toward causes of the present. As the political climate changes, inevitably the relevancy of much of what has become regular university fare comes into question.

The liberal ascendancy among faculty that is documented in this report is often attributed to the impact of the aging radical Left that entered the faculty ranks after their experiences in the 1960s and 1970s. While this certainly began the shift and started to undermine the barriers against overt politicization, it only comprises a part of the picture. The hiring and tenure approval processes have allowed liberal professors to control decision-making power in academic appointments more than other stakeholders in academia. Academic departments, especially the social sciences and humanities, have become like exclusive political clubs, as hiring and promotion decisions are based on the “collegiality” of a candidate as well as the quality of his or her work.34 Someone has to “fit in.”35

The 1960s cohort that entered academia with an overtly political agenda has had an impact far beyond their own teaching and research through their mentoring and promoting of politically aligned co-workers. Is “acceptable” political belief a criteria for “fitting in” among faculty? Like minds choose each other, and the composition of the faculty becomes self-perpetuating. Yet even this evolution of the faculty does not entirely explain the status of faculty today.

We are perhaps today experiencing a second wave of politicization of faculty. Our analysis shows that while age is generally not a factor in most faculty beliefs, on certain questions, those under 35 show that they are even more liberal than their older counterparts. While older faculty are consistently critical of business, they tend to accept capitalism as the best course and support the idea that America does more good than harm. They are also devoted to the
Democratic Party, rarely choosing to vote for a third party candidate. The youngest faculty, on the other hand, were more likely to vote Nader (6%), distinctly more willing to take a marginal position in America’s political system, even if the candidate has no chance of winning, and arguably ends up empowering the Republican candidate. This could be a function of youth or even a more marked shift leftward.

The results of the survey hint at the youngest faculty maintaining, at least, the current political ideology on campus. Moreover, anti-war, anti-Israel, anti-globalization, and anti-business are all part and parcel of the campus experience. For those who are turned off by this climate, their experience may lead them away from the campus following graduation. Those motivated by it, enamored with the idea of political and social change emanating from bastions of intellectualism may choose to enter academia. They, just as their professors from the 1960s did, bring the fervor of the student protests into the faculty ranks. For these younger faculty, Iraq is the new Vietnam, Israel is the new South Africa, and business is the new global colonizer. While the desire to fight remains the same and translates from one generation to another, the focus has shifted.

Along with this shift, causes on the Left have come to include some ideas that are distinctly not progressive. Other factors have begun to take primacy. For example, the increasing distrust among faculty of America’s motivations or capabilities conflicts with calls for action against oppression in other countries. While the subjugation of women and genocide are traditionally central liberal concerns, they do not supercede a common distrust among faculty for America’s motives or ability to change the world for the better.

The findings of this survey also have significant bearing on the recent and ongoing debates concerning government funding of certain programs in higher education. Through various avenues, federal and state governments give $180 billion to colleges and universities. There are efforts, both at the state level and at the fed-
eral level, to link some of the public funding for higher education to greater scrutiny. Among the most controversial of these is the establishment of an oversight committee for Area Studies funding, including attempts to link continued funding to basic guidelines for intellectual diversity. The response to these measures within the academic community has been almost universally hostile, with accusations of McCarthyism, blacklisting, and censorship. Fighting government oversight has been framed as the new front for the defense of free speech and those who seek catalysts for change in academia are invariably accused of being right-wing ideologues who advocate censorship and attempt to abrogate academic freedom.

Yet when one regards this imbroglio in light of the political imbalance within faculty ranks, particularly within those disciplines that are the target of the proposed reforms, these accusations seem a bit disingenuous. Indeed, questions about the current political trends in higher education among some state and federal government officials seem quite reasonable. If it is true that one of the great benefits of a university to a society and its government is to be a center of debate, then how can American society and its government not wonder about a politically skewed environment on campus?

This conundrum brings us back around to the issue of the dangers of a politicized faculty outweighing the benefits that may be achieved over short periods of time. The largest investor and guarantor of the primacy of American higher education, the public sector and therefore the public, is finding itself conflicted over continued support for certain areas of higher education in its current state. Dissatisfaction within the public, higher education’s most important supporters, should be taken as a loud wake-up call for university administrators and faculty. Rather than stonewalling elected officials with charges of destroying academic freedom when asked serious questions about faculty political bias, perhaps colleges and universities could be thinking about why these questions about the health of academia are being raised and how they might be addressed.
Recently, the President of Iran demanded the expulsion of liberal faculty, and those who did not adhere closely enough to what he deemed appropriate Islam. This appalling assault on the integrity of higher education should be condemned by faculty worldwide. Purging faculty because they are politically liberal by government order is anathema to everything for which the university stands.

It would be absurd to suggest that liberal faculty do not have an important place in American higher education. It should be equally disconcerting that faculty in American universities may be rejected for positions or promotions because they are conservatives. Political culture can be created by edict or by increments.

We reaffirm our belief that if faculty aligned overwhelmingly to the right, the threat to higher education would be identical. A faculty that becomes mired in any one way of thinking does so at the risk of accelerating their own obsolescence, even if they are unaware of why they are becoming obsolete.
APPENDIX: Faculty Survey Methodology
Sampling Procedures, Survey Administration, and Data Weighting

Sampling Procedures
The sample for the faculty survey was randomly selected from listings purchased from MKTG Services of Wilmington, Massachusetts, a compiler and seller of names and related information used primarily in direct marketing. Our sampling frame—the complete list of college faculty compiled—is updated by MKTG Services at least annually (bi-annually for many schools) by using the most current college catalogues to extract information on all faculty members and their departmental affiliation(s). The MKTG list is believed to be as complete and up-to-date a roster of United States college and university faculty as exists.

The sample selection process began by developing an inclusive set of academic field categories and obtaining unduplicated counts of faculty by field, by geographic region, and by field by region. These distributions were validated by checking them against data from the latest available National Survey of Post-Secondary Faculty (NSOPF), conducted by United States Department of Education and available online from DOE’s National Center for Education Statis-
tics. Because the NSOPF was an imperfect source for this due to a not entirely discernable categorization of academic fields (but likely different from ours), minor adjustments in the target distribution were made in a few of the cells.

A total of 6,600 faculty members were randomly selected for the starting sample, stratified by field and region as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A-1: Sample Selections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English/Philos/Relig/Classics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts and Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Sciences/Nursing/Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural/Physical Science and Math</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Behavioral Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The regional clusters of states used in the NSOPF were also used here:

**Region 1:** CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA

**Region 2:** IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD

**Region 3:** AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV

**Region 4:** AZ, NM, OK, TX, CO, ID, MT, UT, WY, AK, CA, HI, NV, OR, WA
The primary objective of these sampling procedures was to product a maximally representative sample of all 4-year college faculty by academic field and region. An alternative plan—considered but ultimately rejected—would have aimed to achieve a sample maximally representative of faculty who students encounter at 4-year institutions. This approach would have given greater weight to selecting professors at larger schools and would have required stratification by school size (enrollment). Readers are urged to bear in mind this important distinction.

Survey Administration

The survey of faculty was conducted as an online, web-based survey. Faculty in the starting sample were sent a letter on the survey contractor’s letterhead, describing the purpose of the survey in general terms, specifying a URL/link to the opening page of the survey along with a unique ID number, and requesting cooperation. A toll-free phone number was also provided for assistance in the event help was needed with the survey mechanics or for respondents wishing additional information. Sampled faculty were also offered a $20 amazon.com gift certificate as an incentive for participating in the survey (which was sent to the e-mail address respondents supplied upon completion).

At least two additional contact attempts were made to reach faculty in the starting sample: first, a post-card was sent to everyone 1-2 weeks following mailing of the initial letter, urging participation and thanking those who had already completed the survey; then, 3-5 weeks later, a follow-up call made to as many remaining non-responders as could be reached, again requesting cooperation with the web survey. Messages were left at the numbers telephoned whenever possible in those cases when the intended respondent could not be reached directly.

In all, the survey generated 1,292 completed questionnaires, of which 23 were eliminated before the analysis because of excessive
missing data. This left a final sample of 1,269. To take account of known bad addresses and other factors causing failed contact attempts, an estimate was derived of the number faculty members having no opportunity to participate in the survey because they could not be reached at least once, or could not be reached in time. Then, adjusting the denominator in the response rate calculation to reflect the estimated number of faculty reached at least once produces a response rate of 24%. The 1,269 usable respondents represent 712 different colleges and universities, with medical schools and different branch locations counted separately. (In a small number of cases, other colleges housed within a university are also counted separately.)

The obtained, final sample was distributed by academic field and region as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A-2: Final Sample Distributions (unweighted)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>Business</td>
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<td>Communications</td>
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<td>Engineering</td>
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<td>English/Philos/Relig/Classics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fine Arts and Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Languages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health Sciences/Nursing/Medicine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natural/Physical Science and Math</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Behavioral Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column %s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Comparing the marginal percentages in Table A-2 with those in Table A-1 (the bottom rows and right-hand columns, respectively) indicates a close correspondence: the regional and academic field distributions are quite similar. Regionally, Region 1 (the Northeast plus several Mid-Atlantic states) is slightly under-represented relative to the starting sample. Across the fields, the medical/health professions are a bit under-represented, as is Business to a lesser extent, while the social sciences show disproportionately large participation. To a lesser degree, the same is true for natural science and math. None of the disparities, however, is marked, and all are corrected via the implementation of post-hoc weighting.

**Weighting**

Post-stratification weights were calculated using the two variables as in the sample selection: geographic region and academic field. “Rim weighting” procedures were applied (sometimes called “marginal weighting”) to minimize the variation in weights across cells while, at the same time, reproducing the estimated population parameter marginals—the target overall frequencies for region and academic field. The procedure produced cell weights with modest variation across 32 cells comprising the weighing matrix: 4 regions X 8 academic fields. (Several of the smaller fields were collapsed.) Examination of the set of weights also shows that this produced few “extreme” weights which differed much from 1.0—indicating once again that there was little non-response bias in the sample with respect to region and academic discipline. In other words, the un-weighted final sample proportions were quite similar to the starting sample proportions (which, in turn, are believed to be good estimates of the population).

The margin of error for this survey is +/- 3%. 
NOTES


3. One study has found that 46% of students say professors use the classroom to present their personal political views. See Politics in the Classroom: A Survey of Students at the Top 50 Colleges & Universities (Connecticut: Conducted for The American Council of Trustees & Alumni by The Center for Survey Research & Analysis at the University of Connecticut, October November 2004), 2.


6. (Cardiff and Klein, 2005)

7. Unless otherwise noted, all general population figures are derived from the 2004 Public Omnibus Survey (San Francisco: Institute for Jewish & Community Research, forthcoming).

8. Literature review by Sid Groeneman. Senior Research Associate, Institute for Jewish & Community Research


13. (Cardiff and Klein, 2005)


16. Other avowedly conservative observers weighing in on this debate include Stephen Balch, president of the National Association of Scholars, who points to the department-oriented system of governance in universities as perpetuating uniformity of thought because they function as “little republics,” being ideologically cohesive because of their small size and majoritarian procedures: “Being diminutive, they easily fall under the sway of compact majorities that persistently monopolize positions of power and grind down opponents. And because the admission of new academic citizens is subject to the majority’s control, as time passes those majorities tend to expand.” See Stephen H. Balch, “The Antidote to Academic Orthodoxy,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 23, 2004, sec. B7. Also, Jim Piereson, former director of the Olin Foundation, writes, “College faculties are today awash in antibusiness and anti-free-market prejudices, with scholarly publications beating the drum against globalization and the supposed deprivations of capitalism.” See Jim Piereson, “Only Encouraging Them,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 18, 2005, sec. editorial.


18. Although of oblique relevance to the present paper, Rothman et. al’s analysis also turns up *prima facie* evidence that practicing Christian faculty and those with conservative views might be suffering systematic discrimination in professional advancement, relative to their peers, after controlling for other factors. The analysis also suggests that women are
also victimized by being under-represented at more prestigious institutions. The authors caution that the finding of institutional discrimination against conservative faculty is preliminary. In an incidental inference from their analysis, Rothman et al note that left-right (i.e., liberal-conservative) self-designation might be a less precise measure of ideological orientation than an index derived from responses to specific issues—a conclusion consistent with other political science research. If true, as we believe it is, the implication is to rely less on self-identification in studying the political views of faculty. Political behavior may be a better indicator of belief than self-identification.

19. This paper has been criticized for questionable measurement, among other faults. See Barry Ames, David C. Barker, Chris W. Bonneau, and Christopher J. Carman, "Hide the Republicans, the Christians, and the Women: A Response to ‘Politics and Professional Advancement Among College Faculty’," *The Forum* 3, no 2 (2005). Most of this blistering critique of Rothman, Lichter & Nevitte deals with the authors’ finding of institutional discrimination, but some of it also applies to their research more generally.

20. Totals for charts may not add up to 100% due to rounding error.


22. *IJCR 2004 Public Omnibus Survey*. Also, CNN exit polls reported a 6% increase in voting for Bush between voters under 30 years of age and voters between 45 and 59 years of age, and a 9% increase for those above 60 years of age. See “Election Results,” *CNN.com*, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (accessed September 1, 2006).

23. Election Results, *CNN.com*


27. Iran was not a primary focus of news at the time of this survey and would likely be viewed more negatively today considering the increasing activity within the United Nations regarding Iran’s nuclear program.


37. Tobin, Weinberg, and Ferer, The UnCivil University, 6.

38. Committee on Education and the Workforce, “Education committee approves Hoekstra measure to strengthen international studies in higher education, ensure programs fulfill national security needs,” news release, September 17, 2003.

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